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ABSTRACT
In January 2008, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that trading put options of a
company’s stock based on inside information allegedly obtained by
hacking into a computer network did not violate antifraud provisions
of federal securities law. The court ruled that the defendant’s alleged
“hacking and trading” did not amount to a violation of section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, promulgated
thereunder, because there was no proof the hacker breached a fiduciary
duty in obtaining the information. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the District Court’s
decision, finding that a breach of fiduciary duty was not required for
computer hacking to be “deceptive.” This article evaluates the Second
Circuit’s decision in S.E.C. v. Dorozhko in light of the assumption
that liability under the misappropriation theory requires a breach of
fiduciary duty. This article also explores how the Second Circuit’s
decision may potentially expand section 10(b) liability to a wider
range of parties who take advantage of access to material nonpublic
information by trading securities based on that information.
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INTRODUCTION
Hacking into a computer system to obtain financial information
and trading securities based on that information may be illegal, but
whether it constitutes insider trading under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is a different matter. In 2008, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that a Ukrainian hacker who made almost $300,000 through
“hacking and trading” did not violate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
because there was no proof the hacker breached a fiduciary duty in
obtaining the information.1 However, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court and held that a breach of fiduciary
duty was not required for such “hacking and trading” to be a violation
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.2
The Second Circuit’s opinion expands the definition of insider
trading under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
extending liability to defendants who did not breach a fiduciary duty
in obtaining the inside information.3 This decision challenges the
1

S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009).
3
Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Fiduciary Duty and “Deceptive” Fraudulent
Conduct under Rule 10(b), N.Y. L.J., Aug. 31, 2009, at 3.
2
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common assumption, gathered from a line of United States Supreme
Court cases,4 that liability under the misappropriation theory requires
a breach of fiduciary duty. The decision also differs from the dicta and
holdings of three other circuit court decisions.5
This Article examines and evaluates the Second Circuit’s decision
in light of Supreme Court precedent and the assumption that liability
under the misappropriation theory requires a breach of fiduciary duty.
This Article then compares the Second Circuit’s decision to the
differing circuit court rulings addressing this issue. Finally, this Article
explores the implications of the Second Circuit’s decision and provides
practice pointers based on these implications.
I. INSIDER TRADING UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 permits the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate rules
and regulations to protect the public and investors by prohibiting the
“use or employ” of “any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance” in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.6
Rule 10b-5, which implements this provision, prohibits any act or
omission resulting in fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase
4

See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that the
mere possession of nonpublic market information did not result in a duty to disclose
under § 10(b)); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (adopting the
misappropriation theory); S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002) (holding that a
securities broker who traded securities under his client’s account and transferred the
proceeds to his own account, amounted to a scheme to defraud that was “in
connection with” the security transactions within the meaning of § 10(b)).
5
See generally Regents of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc.,
482 F.3d 372, 389 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that the Supreme Court “has established
that a device, such as a scheme, is not ‘deceptive’ unless it involves breach of some
duty of candid disclosure”); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 951 (4th Cir. 1995)
(suggesting mere thieves do not violate § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by trading on stolen
information); S.E.C. v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that
defendant’s argument of being a “mere thief” was “[t]he only possible barrier to
application of the misappropriation theory”).
6
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
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or sale of securities.7
The Supreme Court has established that there are two complimentary theories of insider trading, each with a fiduciary principle at
its core.8 Under the “traditional theory” of insider trading liability,
corporate insiders violate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when they
trade their corporation’s securities while having knowledge of material,
nonpublic information.9 The Supreme Court has expanded on this
theory, holding that a corporate insider violates section 10(b) by giving
a “tip” to an outsider for the purpose of having the outsider trade, and
the outsider does trade.10 However, the tippee is only liable under
section 10(b) for trading on material nonpublic information if the
tippee is aware or should have been aware that the tipper breached his
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee.11
In United States v. O’Hagan, the Supreme Court adopted the
“misappropriation theory” of liability under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. Under this theory, a person outside the corporation violates
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he misappropriates material
nonpublic information for the purpose of trading securities without
disclosing the use of the corporation’s material nonpublic information.12 Instead of relying on a fiduciary relationship between the
company insider and purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the
misappropriation theory bases liability on a “fiduciary-turned-trader’s
deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential
information.”13
Although fiduciary principles underlie both theories of insider
trading, the SEC continues to bring complaints under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 regardless of whether a fiduciary-like duty has been
breached. Supreme Court precedent is therefore important because it
sets the boundaries for such prosecution.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
Id.
Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
Id.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
Id.
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT DETERMINES DOROZHKO DID NOT VIOLATE
SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
In October 2007, Oleksandr Dorozhko, a Ukrainian national,
hacked into the computer network of Thomson Financial, Inc.,
obtaining access to IMS Health, Inc.’s soon-to-be-released negative
earnings announcement.14 Based on this information, Dorozhko
purchased all available put options in IMS Health, totaling
$41,670.90.15 When the market opened the morning following the
release of IMS Health’s third quarter earnings to the public, the stock
plummeted and Dorozhko sold all of his 630 IMS Health put options,
realizing a net profit of $286,456.59 overnight.16
The SEC alleged in a complaint, filed against Dorozhko on
October 29, 2007, that Dorozhko violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b5 “by either hacking into a computer network and stealing material
nonpublic information, or through a more traditionally-recognized
means of insider trading such as receiving a tip from a corporate
insider.”17 The SEC also obtained “a temporary restraining order
freezing the proceeds of Dorozhko’s trades.”18
Relying principally on three Supreme Court opinions (Chiarella v.
United States,19 United States v. O’Hagan,20 and S.E.C. v. Zandford21), the
District Court determined that the “deceptive” element of section
10(b) required a breach of a fiduciary duty.22 The District Court held
that such “‘hacking and trading’ [did] not amount to a violation of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because Dorozhko did not breach any
fiduciary or similar duty ‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of a
14

S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id.
16
Id. at 326-27.
17
Id. at 322.
18
Id. at 322-23.
19
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
20
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
21
S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
22
Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-30;
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653-60; Zandford, 535 U.S. at 825).
15
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security.”23 Although the District Court did note that Dorozhko “may
have broken the law,” the Court found Dorozhko not liable under
section 10(b) “because he owed no fiduciary or similar duty either to
the source of his information or those he transacted with in the
market.”24 Soon after, however, the Second Circuit reversed and held
that a breach of fiduciary duty is not a required element of a section
10(b) complaint.25
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN LIGHT OF SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT
Prior to the Second Circuit’s decision in S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, no
federal court had ever held that the theft of material nonpublic
information by a corporate outsider who subsequently trades securities
based on that information violates section 10(b).26 The Second
Circuit’s decision negates the assumption that liability under the
misappropriation theory requires a breach of fiduciary duty. In
reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit relied primarily on the
same three Supreme Court decisions relied upon by the District Court
in its analysis: Chiarella v. United States,27 United States v. O’Hagan,28 and
S.E.C. v. Zandford.29
In its analysis, the District Court reasoned that the SEC was
seeking to revive Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Chiarella.30 The District
Court suggested that Dorozhko’s actions were fraudulent within the
meaning of section 10(b) because he “stole” the information he traded
on.31 While the District Court relied on Chiarella to further support its
conclusion that a breach of fiduciary duty was required to uphold a
conviction under section 10(b), the Second Circuit read Chiarella and
23

Id. at 324.
Id.
25
S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009).
26
Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
27
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
28
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
29
S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
30
Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 334.
31
Id.
24
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its dissent in a different light.
In Chiarella, an employee of a financial printer used material nonpublic information to purchase securities offered by acquiring and
target corporations.32 The Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 conviction, because the “mere possession
of nonpublic market information” did not result in a duty to disclose
under section 10(b).33 Since the defendant was under no obligation to
disclose his knowledge of inside information, the defendant’s
nondisclosure was not fraud.34
The Second Circuit distinguished Chiarella as an example of fraud
based on nondisclosure while Dorozhko dealt with an affirmative
misrepresentation.35 Chiarella addressed the “legal effect of the
[defendant’s] silence”; whether the defendant had a duty to disclose or
abstain from trading.36 Whereas, in Dorozhko, the SEC argued that
Dorozhko “affirmatively misrepresented himself in order to gain access
to material, nonpublic information, which he then used to trade.”37
In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation
theory and held that when a person misappropriates confidential
information for securities trading purposes in breach of a duty to the
source of the information, that person commits fraud “in connection
with” a securities transaction, thereby violating section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.38 The District Court noted that the O’Hagan court’s application
of the misappropriation theory remained consistent with the
traditional theory, in premising “a violation of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 on a breach of duty to disclose or abstain.”39 The District Court
found significance in the Supreme Court’s decision not to adopt
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Chiarella, noting that the Supreme Court
certainly could have chosen to adopt Justice Blackmun’s more
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
Id. at 235.
Id.
S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 47 n.4 (2d Cir. 2009).
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226.
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 49.
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997).
S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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expansive view of Rule 10b-5.40 The District Court therefore
concluded, based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in both Chiarella
and O’Hagan, that a breach of a fiduciary duty was required under
both the traditional and misappropriation theory.41
In its analysis of O’Hagan, the Second Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court had found that the defendant “had committed fraud
through ‘silence’ because the defendant had a duty to disclose to the
source of the information (his client) that he would trade on the
information.”42 Similar to its analysis of Chiarella, the Second Circuit
attempted to distinguish O’Hagan from the Dorozhko case on the basis
of nondisclosure compared to affirmative misrepresentation. In the
view of the Second Circuit, the defendant’s “silence” resulted in fraud
based on the defendant’s fiduciary duty to disclose to the source of the
nonpublic information. O’Hagan, on the other hand, did not concern
an affirmative misrepresentation and the Court did not address
whether the defendant would have violated section 10(b) had the
defendant not had a fiduciary duty to disclose to the source of the
nonpublic information.
In Zandford, the Supreme Court held that a securities broker who
traded securities under his client’s account and transferred the
proceeds to his own account, committed a scheme to defraud that was
“in connection with” the securities transactions within the meaning of
section 10(b).43 Although the District Court conceded that Zandford
stood for “the proposition that Dorozhko’s alleged scheme was ‘in
connection with’ the purchase or sale of securities,” it stopped short of

40

Id. Justice Blackmun views section 10(b) as a “catchall” provision designed to
protect investors from unknown risks. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). In his view, the court’s approach in Chiarella, “advance[d] an
interpretation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that stops short of their full implications.”
Id. at 247. Justice Blackmun would have instead held “that persons having access to
confidential material information that is not legally available to others generally are
prohibited by Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their structural
informational advantage through trading in affected securities.” Id. at 251.
41
Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
42
S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2009).
43
S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
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finding Dorozhko’s alleged scheme “deceptive.”44 The District Court
relied on Justice Stevens’ reiterations that “Zandford’s section 10(b)
violation was predicated on his breach of fiduciary duty” to suggest
“that there can be no ‘deception,’ and therefore no liability under
section 10(b), absent the existence and breach of a fiduciary duty.”45
The Second Circuit did not address this part of the District Court’s
analysis. However, based on the Second Circuit’s final conclusion, it
appears that the Second Circuit did not find the Zandford decision to
be dispositive as to whether Dorozhko’s alleged scheme was
“deceptive.”
While the District Court relied on these three decisions to
conclude the “deceptive” element of section 10(b) requires a breach of
fiduciary duty, the Second Circuit concluded that “none of the
Supreme Court opinions relied upon by the District Court . . .
establishes a fiduciary-duty requirement as an element of every
violation of section 10(b).”46 Instead, the Second Circuit reasoned that
“nondisclosure in breach of a fiduciary duty” merely satisfies section
10(b)’s requirement of a “deceptive device or contrivance,” and
therefore does not “require a fiduciary relationship as an element of an
actionable securities claim under section 10(b).”47 By concluding that a
fiduciary relationship was not a required element of an actionable
securities claim under section 10(b), the Second Circuit was free to
adopt the SEC’s theory of fraud and determine that an affirmative
misrepresentation to gain access to material, nonpublic information
and then trade on that information could be “deceptive.”
IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Second Circuit is the first federal court to hold that theft of
material nonpublic information by a corporate outsider and
subsequent trading on that information violates section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. Three other Circuit Courts have addressed this issue and appear
44
45
46
47

Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
Id.
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 48.
Id. at 49.
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to side with the District Court’s decision that section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 always require a breach of a fiduciary duty.
The dicta contained in opinions by the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits suggest that thieves of material nonpublic information do not
violate section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 when they trade on the basis of that
information. In S.E.C. v. Cherif, a former employee of an investment
bank secretly kept his key card and broke into the bank’s offices on a
number of occasions to steal information on pending corporate
transactions.48 He then traded securities on the basis of that
information, making a profit.49 Though the Seventh Circuit sustained
Cherif’s conviction on the grounds that an employee’s duty to a
former employer is not extinguished upon termination, the court did
comment on Cherif’s argument that he was a “mere thief” who owed
no duty to anyone.50 The Seventh Circuit remarked that Cherif’s
argument of being a “mere thief” was “[t]he only possible barrier to
application of the misappropriation theory.”51
In another court of appeals case, United States v. Bryan, the Fourth
Circuit suggested even more forcefully that mere thieves do not violate
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by trading on stolen information.52 The
defendant, a former director of the West Virginia Lottery, used
confidential information about forthcoming contracts to purchase
shares in companies that did business with the West Virginia Lottery.53
The Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision, choosing
not to adopt the misappropriation theory in part because the theory
would lead future courts to expand and eventually abandon the
concept of fiduciary duty that lay at the heart of section 10(b).54 The
Fourth Circuit predicted that courts would eventually be forced to
abandon the requirement of a fiduciary duty all together and hold that
mere thieves violated the misappropriation theory.55
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

S.E.C. v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 406-07 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id.
Id. at 411.
Id.
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 951 (4th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 939.
Id. at 951.
Id.
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Although both the Fourth and Seventh Circuits seem to suggest
that “mere thieves” of material nonpublic information do not violate
section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 when they trade on the basis of that
information, it should be noted that both of these cases were decided
before O’Hagan and the adoption of the misappropriation theory by
the Supreme Court. The pre-dating of O’Hagan combined with the fact
that these comments were included in the dicta of these court of
appeals cases raises doubt as to the authority of these cases.
The Fifth Circuit, however, held a breach of a fiduciary duty is a
required element of a section 10(b) violation. In Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., the Fifth Circuit discussed
how the Supreme Court “has established that a device, such as a
scheme, is not ‘deceptive’ unless it involves breach of some duty of
candid disclosure.”56 The Fifth Circuit made this observation relying
on the same precedent as that of the District Court in Dorozhko.
In summary, there is a circuit split as to whether a fiduciary duty is
a required element of a section 10(b) violation: In the Second Circuit,
the SEC need not prove a breach of a fiduciary duty; but in the
Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, the SEC must prove such a
breach. In fact, the Second Circuit even comments that “[a]t least one
of [its] sister circuits has made the same observation [as the District
Court] relying on the same precedent.”57
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION
The Second Circuit appears to have opened the door to a legal
theory that computer hacking in connection with insider trading may
sometimes be “deceptive” under section 10(b), while rejecting the idea
that “deceptive” actions under section 10(b) can only occur through a
violation of a fiduciary duty. Under the prior liability regime, a
“paradoxical situation” existed where a person who obtained material
nonpublic information “legally” could be held liable under criminal
56

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482
F.3d 372, 389 (5th Cir. 2007).
57
S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 2009) (referring to the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 482 F.3d 372).
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and civil securities law for trading on such information, whereas a
thief, acting illegally, might not be.58 Without the Second Circuit’s
ruling, this situation would continue to be exploited by information
thieves because there would be no associated consequence, under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability, if the thief were to trade on such
information.59 Even the District Court was aware of this situation,
commenting that “[t]his case highlights a potential gap arising from
reliance on fiduciary principles in the legal analysis that courts have
employed to define insider trading.”60
Under the reasoning used by the Second Circuit, the SEC will be
able to bring its insider trading cases under the affirmative
misrepresentation category to avoid having to show a breach of duty by
the defendant.61 This newfound ability may result in broader
enforceability under section 10(b), exposing more defendants to
potential civil liability under the securities law.62 Both the District
Court and Second Circuit noted that such “hacking and trading”
schemes have typically been prosecuted under federal and state
criminal statutes. The SEC will now be able to pursue cases of
computer hacking as violations of federal securities laws in addition to
violations of other federal and state criminal statutes. Thus, this
decision will provide the SEC wide latitude in determining how to
address securities-related misconduct, at least within the Second
Circuit.
The Second Circuit’s decision also has the potential to expand
section 10(b) liability to a wider range of parties who take advantage of
access to material nonpublic information and trade securities based on
58

Carolyn Silane, Electronic Data Theft: A Legal Loophole for Illegally-Obtained
Information—A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and E.U. Insider Trading Law, 5 SETON
HALL CIRCUIT REV. 333, 363 (2009).
59
Id. However, such hackers may still be liable under mail or wire fraud, 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (2006 & Supp. II 2008) or 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006 & Supp. II 2008),
and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
60
S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
61
Peter Henning, On the SEC, Mark Cuban, and a Man Named Dorozhko, WALL
ST. J., Jul. 28, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/07/28/on-the-sec-mark-cubanand-a-man-named-dorozhko/.
62
Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 3.
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that information. Anyone who deceptively obtains information and
trades securities based on that information may be subjected to
enforcement or liability, regardless of their relationship to the issuer of
the information. Under this new regime, securities traders will need to
be cautious as to how they come into possession of confidential
information. If they do so in a manner that could be viewed as
“deceptive,” then trading securities based on that information could
violate the securities laws, regardless of whether any duty was breached.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s decision appears to have expanded the
Supreme Court’s definition of insider trading and extended section
10(b) liability to a wider range of parties who trade securities based on
access to material nonpublic information. This decision has opened
the door to a legal theory that computer hacking in connection with
insider trading may sometimes be “deceptive” under section 10(b),
while foreclosing the argument that “deceptive” actions under section
10(b) can only occur through a violation of a fiduciary duty. The
impact of this decision, however, is minimized by the lack of a clear
and consistent theory of insider trading liability as to the fiduciary duty
requirement among the circuit courts. Given the split on this issue
between the Second Circuit and the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh
Circuits, it is possible that the Supreme Court will review this issue in
the near future. Until this issue is resolved by the Supreme Court or
Congress intervenes, securities traders will have to monitor how they
come into possession of confidential information. If the information is
obtained in a manner that could be viewed as “deceptive,” then trading
securities based on that information could violate section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
PRACTICE POINTERS


When using material, nonpublic information to purchase or sell
securities, traders should be aware of whether they have a fiduciary
duty to the source of the information or whether there is such a
duty between the source of the information and a third party. If a
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fiduciary duty does exist, a trader should not purchase or sell
securities based on the information without disclosure.


Even if no fiduciary duty exists, traders should still monitor the
manner in which material, nonpublic information is obtained if
such information is used to purchase or sell securities. If the
information was obtained in a manner that could be viewed as
“deceptive,” then trading securities based on that information
could violate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and the trader should
therefore abstain from trading on the information.



Even if a trade based on material, nonpublic information does not
violate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, traders should still consider
the reputational damage and significant legal expenses they may
incur in defending such trades. In addition, traders should
consider other potential legal consequences (e.g., mail or wire
fraud, traditional theft theories, or other tort actions) that may
arise through use of the material, nonpublic information.

